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much of the fiery invective and blood-curdling epithet hurled
at men who equally with their accusers are American freemen,
impressed with the absolute necessity for maintaining sacred,
the guaranties of life, liberty and property, and who are
probably not more in love with corruption and greed, or
more disposed to crush the humble and worthy, then the
average of their fellow-citizens.
The saving grace of American humor which delights in the
contemplation of grotesque exaggeration has often saved us
from domestic turbulence, which the turgid exuberance of
denunciatory language might have otherwise excited, against
lawfully-constituted authority ; and it may be that same useful trait will prevent the success of the present agitators against
the Federal courts.
But whatever fate betide the Federal judiciary I hope that it
may always be said of them, as a whole, by the impartial observer
of their conduct, that they have not lacked in the two essentials of judicial moral character, a sincere desire to reach right
conclusions and firmness to enforce them.
THE DECISIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA ON THE
STATUTES OF I887 AND i8gi REGULATING
THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC.
Discussion of the liquor laws from a legal, political and
moral standpoint, has created such public agitation over the
subject and made it of so much importance, that a general
report of the workings of all systems throughout the country is near at hand. Anticipating such a report, it may be
assumed that a thorough knowledge of the existing laws of
any state will not be without advantage to one who wishes
to become an intelligent reader of the question; nor will
interest in such laws be confined to the limits of that state

alone. Discovery of the weakness in a law, and proper
remedial legislation for the same, can only be obtained by
a comparison with other systems, their interpretation, workings and effect.
The extent and value of the business legalized by the
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Acts of Assembly approved May 13, I887 (known as the
Retail Act); of May 24, 1887, and June 9, 18gi (known
as the Wholesale Acts), and the moral issues involved in
the efforts to restrain their operation, have developed certain contentions over their interpretation, which it is the
purpose of this article to set forth. There has been no
attempt made to give an exhaustive review of the liquor
laws, but only to summarize all those cases that have been
considered important enough to be taken to the Supreme
Court of the state, and on which the Acts themselves are
somewhat doubtful.
For this purpose the cases form
themselves naturally under three heads: I. Petition ; 2. Sale,
and 3. Transfer.
PETITION.

Since the passage of the Acts of 1887, the Quarter Sessions
courts havc had jurisdiction of the license cases in their
respective counties, and those courts alone can grant or refuse
the privilege of selling liquor: (Com. v. Ssveitzer, 129-644.)
But a majority of the court is all that is necessary to validate
th. grant, though the president dissent: (Branch's Licensc,
164-427.)
No person has any property in the right to become a
liquor dealer, so that no one can compel the grant of a
license even in the absence of any allegation that he is an
improper person to be so favored. The grant or refusal is
discretionary with the court. But this discretion is a legal
one to be exercised wisely and not arbitrarily. The judge
who grants or refuses all licenses without proper cause is
not exercising a judicial discretion, but an arbitrary power.
Therefore the court could not refuse to act upon an application, but it could act and refuse to grant the prayer of the
petitioner; and a mandamus would not lie to force its assent,
though the applicant has complied with all the requirements
and is qualified to conduct the business: (Raudenbusch's
Pet., 120-328; Ostertag's Pet., 144-426.)

If a hearing is had, and the proceedings are conducted in a
proper and legal manner, that is all that can be demanded:
(Petition of Michael Colarn, 134-5 51 ; King's Application,
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145.) And the applicant can be denied even a hearing, if he refuses to appear and testify at the request of the
court: (Wheelin's Pet., 134-557.) Further, the reasons for
refusal form no part of the record, and will not be reviewed on
appeal under the Act of May 9, 1889, it being but a substi-

tute for a common law certiorari: (Pet. of Hemry Berg, 139354; Rules of Practice, 125-xxl.; 13 I-xxi.)
The objects of the Retail Act of May 13, 1887, P_ L. ioS,
and the Wholesale Act of May 24, 1887, P. L. 194, were

essentially different. The former was to restrain the sale of
liquors, but the latter was a revenue act. Formerly, therefore, the same reasoning did not apply to the cases of wholesale applications throughout the state as to those for retail
petitions; and there was not the same discretion allowed the
quarter sessions in the former as in the latter: (Pollard's
Pet., 127-507.)

The reasons for this former distinction will be apparent from
a review of the decisions.
Section I I of the Act of May 24, 1887 : "Licenses shall be
granted in such manner as is provided by existing laws"
-refers to the "existing laws" in regard to wholesale and not
retail licenses as granted under the Act of May I 3 th (Pollard's Pet., supra.) At that time and up to the passage of the
Act of June 9, 1891, it was always a question of what were
the " existing laws" as to wholesale licenses in a given locality.
The Act of 1856, the foundation of our license system, committed the granting and refusal of licenses to the quarter sessions of the proper county, except Philadelphia and Allegheny. From that time on, Philadelphia and Allegheny had
a license system peculiar to them. In the rest of the state,
however, the power to grant licenses has been continued in
the quarter sessions by the Acts of 1858, 1867 and supplements: (Ostertag's Pet. supra; Knarr's Pt., 127-554; Pet.
of IV. C. 13lc'Nuty, 142-475.) In the absence of local laws,
these acts governed as the " existing laws," and by them
wholesale and retail licenses were placed on the same footing as far as the discretionary power of the court came in
question : (Xordstrom's Pet., 127-542.) The result was that
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outside of Philadelphia and Allegheny counties the same
discretionary power existed in both wholesale and retail
cases, These were the existing laws referred to in the Act
of May 24, 1887. But in these two excepted counties the
wholesale petitioner demanded as a matter of right the
grant of his privilege, if he was a citizen of the United
States, of temperate habits and good moral character:
(Prospect Brewiig Company's Pet., i27-523 ; Pollard's Pet.
supra) As can readily be seen, there was considerable
unfairness in the operation of this law. The wholesale
dealer of Montgomery county, though as fully qualified as
his neighbor in Philadelphia, could only pray for his privilege,
while the other demanded his. There was still another deficiency that needed a remedy. Under the Act of May
24th, the dealer could sell by the quart. As Mr,Chief Justice Paxson said : " It seems a perversion of terms to call a
person who sells by the quart a wholesale dealer, It is practically a retail traffic, and of the worst character." And in
the same opinion the court recommends the whole subject to
the attention of the legislature: (Nordstrom's Pet. supra.) .
At the next meeting of that body, the request of the Supreme
Court was complied with; and the two defects above referred
to remedied to some extent by the passage of the Act of June
9, i89i. This act prohibited the disposal by wholesalers of
spirituous or vinous liquors in less quantities than one quart,
and brewed or malt liquors in less quantities than twelve pint
bottles (Act of June 9, 1891, P. L. 258). It also made a
change in the discretionary power of the court. The quarter
*sessions can now refuse 'a wholesale license, when it is not
necessary for the accommodation of the public, or the applicants are not fit persons. The refusal is not to be an arbitrary
one, but based on an opinion " formed after due regard has
been given to the number and character of the petitioners for
and against such application:" (Johnson's License, 156-322).
The rules which govern the court in the grant or refusal of
wholesale licenses under the Act of 1891 are tersely summed
up by Mr. Justice DEAN in Gross' License (161-345)
"I. The discretion must be exercised in a lawful manner.
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"The applicant has a right to be heard and so have the objec,
"tors. A decree without a hearing or opportunity for hearing
"at a time fixed by rule or standing order as the law directs,
"would be manifestly illegal and on certiorari would be set
"aside.
" II. If the court has in lawful manner performed the duty
"imposed upon it, it is not our business to inquire whether it
"has made a mistake in its conclusions of fact. Whether the
"same facts induce in our minds the same belief as in that of
"the court below, as to the character of the applicant and
"other material averments is wholly immaterial; it is the dis"cretion of the Court of Quarter Sessions, not ours, that the
"law requires.
"III. A decree made arbitrarily or in violation of law, it is
"our plain duty to set aside. For example, if a judge should
"refuse a license because in his opinion the law authorizing
"licenses'is a bad law, or if he should grant all licenses because
"he believed the law wrong as tending to confer a privilege on
"a special few, in either case there would be no exercise of
"judicial discretion; both would be the mere despotic asser"tion of arbitrary will by one in power; that sort of lawless"ness which is least excusable and excites most indignation.
"IV. If the record shows that the decree was had after
"hearing at a time fixed by rule or standing order, the pre"sumption is that the decree is judicial and not arbitrary, and
"this presumption is not rebutted by an argument from the
"evidence that the court ought to have reached a different
"conclusion.
"The court need not set out the legal reasons for its action.
"It is only bound to save them."
Where the court acknowledged in its decree that there
were no reasons for refusal, and, if it had been a wholesale
license that was sought, they would have felt bound to grant
it, a procedendo was awarded on the ground that it was not
the exercise of a legal discretion : (Kelminski's License, 164231). Since the Act of 1891 an arbitrary refusal to grant a
wholesale license is on the same footing as a refusal to grant
a retail license ; and now no warrant of law exists for distinction
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in this particular between the two kinds of privileges, it being
removed by that act. The discretion of the court is the same
in both cases : (Kehnhiski's License, supra.)
But a refusal based on the non-necessity for more than two
wholesale houses in the same place was upheld, as the discretionary power of the court had been properly used-: (M3ead's
License, 161-375). That the place was not located in a city
or town, but in a township ; that it was not necessary; that
the former licensees of the place violated the liquor laws; and
that a legitimate business was not conducted there formed
good reasons for refusal in one of our latest cases: (Johnson's License, 165-315). But the simple assertion that the
plaze was " unnecessary for the accommodation of the public"
gives no ground for refusal: (Gemas' License, 36 W. N.
367.)
Although not expressly decided, it may be safely said that
the Act of i89I, being general in its terms, applies to Philadelphia and Allegheny counties, and dealers in those places
can now no longer demand their licenses as was done in the
Prospect Brewing Company's Petition and Pollards License,
but like the petitioners of other counties, they must appeal to
the grace of the court.
Notwithstanding these acts, it must be understood that
there are counties in this Commonwealth in which no licenses
may be granted. A general law does not repeal a local statute by implication. So that neither the Act of May 13,
which expressly protects local laws; or May 24th, which is
silent on the subject, both being general, would apply to
counties governed by special prohibitory statutes. Potter
county, which still maintains its prohibition system, is an
example of this: (Murdock's Pet., 149-341.)
SALES.

The first defence made to an obnoxious law is usually the
'contention that it is unconstitutional, and the Brook's High
'License Law formed no exception to this general rule. Its
constitutionality was attacked on the ground. (I) It offends
against Par. 3, Art. III of the State Constitution, which
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declares: " No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall
be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be
clearly expressed in its title." (2) It is special legislation,
because it makes certain liquor laws applicable to one county
and not to another by permitting the special prohibitory laws
of some sections to stand.
In answer to the first argument, the Supreme Court said:
"There is not a single section or clause of any section, that
is not clearly germane to the subject expressed in its title."
And to the second: " Nor is it special legislation for the
reason stated. The object of the proviso (protecting special
prohibitory laws) was not to designate other districts in which
no license to sell intoxicating liquors shall be granted; but
to avoid any doubt as to the intention of the legislature to
leave intact special prohibitory laws enacted prior to the adoption of the present constitution." In other words, not to legislate specially for those different counties, but, to the contrary, not to legislate at all: (Com. v. Sellers, 130-32.)
Nor does it take away a vested right by changing the law
under which the licensee has previously held, for he takes
subject to subsequent legislation, and this applies with the
same force to the Act of 1891. So that where a license was
still in effect under the Act of 1887, the dealer was bound to
conform in his sales to the Act of 1891, which changed his
status for the worse: (Com. v. Donahue, 149-104; CoM. v.
Sellers, 130-32.)

The question of what are vinous, spirituous, malt or brewed
liquors within the meaning of the act is not one of law but of
fact, and as such to be decided by a jury and not by the
court' If there is no evidence of whether the liquor is either
vinous, spirituous, malt or brewed, the court must direct a verdict for the accused. But, if there is a scintilla of evidence
on the subject, none but the jury can decide it. So cider,
though not usually containing any of these qualities, might
under some circumstances that would appear from the evidence be brought within the classes named: (Con v. Reybmig,
122-299.)

It is not only the sale of liquors that is obnoxious, but the
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"furnishing" as well, when it is delivered on election day and
Sunday, or to a minor or one of " known intemperate habits."
(Sect. 17 Act., 1887). This provision applies not only to
dealers, but to all persons. Whether the "furnishing " be by
gift, sale or otherise is immaterial. It is a misdemeanor to the
same extent. To these excepted classes no one can lawfully
give or sell: (Altenburg v. Com., 126-602.)
But the Act of 1887 does not attempt to control the private habits or domestic usage, therefore, the citizen can use on
his own table or in his own house what beverages best please
him. It is only when the conduct of the individual is such
that the public morals or public peace are affected by it, that
it becomes a matter of public concern and is subject to the
examination and control of the criminal courts. Under this
rule no man in Pennsylvania has a right to treat one who is
visibly intoxicated : (Altenburg v. Com.); but he can treat on
Sunday, and that, too, away from his home: (Com. v.
'Heckler, xxxvi. W. N. C. 363. Candidates on election
day cannot furnish beer free to voters, nor can persons
fo-bidden to sell on Sunday give away liquor with the
same result. But, if for reasons of health or habit, one
chooses to supply his own table with his own liquor for use
by himself, his family, or his guests on Sunday, no law of the
Commonwealth prevents him: (Corn. v. Carey, 151-368). So
that where detectives in order to discover train-wreckers entert imed suspects by furnishing them liquor at their house on
Sunday, no conviction followed. But where a farmer gave
free of charge to persons visibly intoxicated, he was convicted; and a druggist met the same fate who sold twice on
the same prescription: (Com. v. Prickett, 132-37I.)
It is a general rule that ignorance of fact excuses where the
act if done knowingly, would be ma/ln in se. But where a
statute commands that an act be done or omitted, which in the
absence of such statute, might have been done or omitted
without culpability, ignorance of fact or the state of things
contemplated by the statute does not excuse. Where the
saloon-keeper is ignorant of the age of his customer, he cannot
set this up as a defence.
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By the Act of 1854 the sale had to be wilful, but by succeeding legislation (Acts of 1867, 1875 and 1887) the sale
need only be unlawful, the word wilful being omitted. So it
is the act of selling and not the state of mind that stamps the
act as a misdemeanor and at which the law is directed. Any
other construction would practically nullify the act: (In re
Carlson'sLicense, 127-33o). Though it is well nigh impossible for a bartender or saloon-keeper to know the age of one
who may call for a drink, he is liable to have his license taken
away from him, if he sell to a person the day before he is
twenty-one years of age. And that too, though the minor
misrepresents his age. But the dealer is not entirely without
protection. By the Act of May IO, 1881, P. L. 12, minors
representing themselves of age to obtain liquor are punished
by fine and imprisonment; and the same punishment is dealt
out to those who represent the minors to be of age.
Ignorantia Zegis non excusat. Everyone is bound to know
the law. By this maxim the agent of a licensee acting innocently can be convicted. He is bound to know the limits of
his principal's authority, and if he takes but one step beyond
it, he is liable to indictment under the act. He must be careful
to sell only where the licensee can do so with impunity:
(Stewart v. Corn., 117-378; Zinner v. Co11. 22 W. N. 97;
Com. v. Sweitzer, supra) .
- A brewer's license does not entitle him to sell in two different
places in the county: (Zinner v. Com.). But a brewer who
has taken out a license can manufacture and sell his liquor at
any one point in the county. He need not sell it where he
manufactures, but if he sells away from where he manufactures,
he cannot sell where it is made. In other words he cannot
have two established places to sell the article. Otherwise he
could have as many agencies as there are places in the county:

(Zinner v. Com.).
It is the contract to sell a chattel and not payment or delivery which passes the property, and this rule is recognized
throughout the United States. Whether the title to personal
property passes by a sale depends upon the intent of the
parties. Such intent may be expressly declared or may be
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inferred from circumstances : (Comn. v. Hess, 148-98). Therefore, where orders are sent for liquor C. 0. D. by the purchaser of one county to the seller of another, and delivery is
made by the agent of the seller in the county of the purchaser,
this is a sale in the county of the seller and lawful.- The
carrier or agent in such a case is agent for the purchaser and
delivery to the carrier- in the county of the seller is delivery to
the purchaser, and the sale or contract is complete in the place
of delivery to carrier. It is only the performance'of the don'tract and not the contract itself 'that is in question on the
Collection or non-collection frorh or delivery or non-delivery
to the purchaser-: (Con. v. Fleming, IS3O-I38). The sale is
complete before performance is thought of. But where the
agent took' orders outside of the county of his principal, and
delivered them in the 'same place, the county of the purchaser, this was held an illegal sale. A'dealer can sell to
any person in- the state, provided the sales are made- at his
place of business. But he cannot peddle his beer in counties
not coverdd by his license: (Com. v. Holstine, 132-357). The
purchaser need not call at the business place of the licensee,
but such sales may be made in the ordinary course of business.
So where orders are 'received by mail in the county of the
wholesale dealer and -the liquor is delivered by his wagons or
by common carriers in the county; of the purchaser, the sale
s "a proper'one': (Com. v. Hess, I48-98).'
Nor would pa'yment by check sent through the mail or to the driver, who
-delivered as above, constitute a sale in the 'place of delivery,
and no conviction could follow in such a case for sale outside
the county: (Com. v. Klehimann, 148-I12).2
Selling liquors to persons of "khown intemperate habits"
comes within the same rule as selling to minors, i. e., ignorance
of fact or want of evil intent are not material. " Known intemI Com. v. Brauninger,148-1Il.

2

The rule 'deduced from these decisions would appear to be, that

where the order is received marks the place of sale if the goods are set

aside, or charged on the books of the seller, or any other act indicates
the meeting of the two minds in a contract; while the place of delivery
or payment, being simply the means of performance of a contract already
made, is not material.
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perate habits " means reputation in the neighborhood for
intemperance, and not the actual knowledge of the saloonkeeper. A man who conceals his habits does not come within
this class. His habits must be known not only to his family,
but to his friends, neighbors, and the community at large in
which he lives. He need not be known to every one, but only
generally. It is that kind of a reputation he might have for
honesty and integrity (com. v. Zdt, 138-615 ; C01n. v. Silveriman, 138-642).

Before the passage of the Wilson Bill, which allowed the
states to make their own liquor regulations, even where it
interfered with interstate commerce, there were frequent
attempts to evade the law by shipping the liquor from another state and selling it in the original packages, thus bringing it within the ruling of Leisr v. Hardin (135 U. S. IOO.)
But the Supreme Court decidcd that the stopping of sales on
Sunday, and to minors, and the intemperate habits was not on
the same f)oting as the case referred to, and is not an interference with the traffic of the states within the meaning of
that decision: (Com. v. Zelt, 139-6 15: Corn. v. Silverman,
138-642.)
The law cannot be nullified by the formation of a so-called
social club, which is rim as a cover for the sale of liquor without license, but the steward of such club can be dealt with in
the same manner as the bartender of an unlicensed saloon :
(Com.v. Tier-ney, 148-552). Nor can a bona fide social club
sell to persons, not members, on Sunday, and they are bound
to know who are members of their organization: (Con. v.
Loesch, 153-502.) What rights belong to the members of a
bona fide club as among themselves has never been considered
by our Supreme Court.
A criminal indictment and the forfeiture of license are not
the only punishments meted out to the unfortunate liquor
dealer who seeks to evade the license law. Outside of these
sanctions which the public demands through its criminal
courts, the tavern-keeper is liable in a private action of trespass in our common pleas to a person damaged by an unlawful sale.
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-With a system of punishment like that which sustains the
law of 1887, and the strictness with which it has been construed by our Supreme Court, it is difficult to see why it
should not be effectual to meet the purposes of its passage, if
enforced by a proper administration.
TRANSFERS.

A licensee's privilege is personal and is not assignable, nor
does it go to the personal representatives in case of death.
For this reason a license cannot be transferred unless expressly authorized -by the Act of Assembly and in the mode
therein prescribed. The Act of 188 7 is silent on the question
of transfers, and they are still governed by the Act of April
20, I859, Sect. 7, P. -L. 366. The act provides, that, "if
the party licensed shall die, remove or cease to keep such
house, his, her or their license, may be tranferred by authority granting the same on compliance with the requisitions of
the law,/etc." The requisitions of the law under this act permit a certain discretion to the authority grimting or refusing
licenses, and this discretion is now vested in the courts. This
discretion, like that in the.grants of licenses, depends upon
the la'w and not'the individual opinion of any of the judges;
but if legally exercised is 'not reviewable in the Supreme
Court: (Blumenthal's Pet., 125-412.)
But a licensee can assign his interest in the license granted
to him. Or'to express it more correctly, he can consent to
the transfer of it to his assignee, who succeeds him in the
occupancy of the place. This assignment is subject to the
approval of the Court of Quarter Sessions. There is nothing
unlawful in this consent, as it is essential to the transfer. For
this reason a judgment note given to secure a loan to carry
on the liquor business, and an agreement to transfer the
license on default in payment, is a legal transaction and not
void as against public policy: (Brewing Co. v. Booth, 162I00.)

The right to transfer licenses from one person to another is
purely statutory, and there is nothing in the law that permits
the transfer from one place to another. Therefore, the quar-

